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Introduction 
Financial performance is a critical factor that provides for the long-term sustainability of 
hospitals. “No margin, no mission” goes a saying in the industry, in reference to the fact that 
hospitals without healthy finances cannot fulfill missions of access to healthcare and providing 
quality patient care. Spurred by structural changes to how hospitals are financed initiated by the 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) and continuing flux in the American healthcare system, the 
determinants of hospital profitability has surfaced as a topic of interest amongst policymakers 
and scholars. Hospitals are pillars of any healthcare system, providing many services that smaller 
healthcare facilities cannot such as specialized diagnosis; advanced treatment and therapy for 
inpatients; and around-the-clock operations. Thus, their ongoing viability is in the public interest. 
Hospitals in the United States are mostly financed by three sources (Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS), 2016): private payers—health insurance companies and patients 
paying out-of-pocket; Medicare, for those over 65 years of age and working-aged Social Security 
Disability Insurance beneficiaries; and Medicaid, state-run health insurance programs for low-
income families, children, the blind, elderly, and people with disabilities and, since the ACA, 
single adults located in states that have chosen to expand Medicaid. This quasi-public-private 
system results in differential pricing by hospitals, whereby customers are charged different prices 
for the same goods and services. In aggregate, health insurance companies and individuals 
paying out-of-pocket are charged the highest prices and cross-subsidize patients with public 
insurance which are often loss-generating. In 2014, hospitals had payment-to-cost ratios of 144% 
for private payers, 89% for Medicare, and 90% for Medicaid (American Hospital Association, 
2016). 
4 
 
Eligibility for Medicaid is determined by household income levels. Eligibility, in terms of 
household income requirements, is generally more generous for children, the blind, elderly and 
individuals with disabilities, less so for parents, and miserly for childless adults. Prior to the 
ACA Medicaid expansions, the only insurance option for unemployed adults in the United States 
was purchase through health insurance markets for individuals—an option that often only 
provided limited coverage at exorbitant cost. Uncompensated care for hospitals—defined as bad 
patient debt and charity care— is a significant source of expense for hospitals. One common 
practice amongst the uninsured is to ignore routine medical care, visit emergency rooms if their 
health became critical, and then to default on the unaffordable hospital bills. Uncompensated 
care was equal to 5.3% of total hospital expenses in 2014. 
Theoretically, reductions in the number of uninsured individuals through expansions in 
Medicaid eligibility should increase the profitability of hospitals vis-à-vis reductions in 
uncompensated care costs and additional reimbursement for patients newly covered by Medicaid. 
Different types of hospitals, however, have different levels of uncompensated care and serve 
different patient populations. Safety-net hospitals with greater amounts of uncompensated care 
and more uninsured patients should benefit the most from expansions in Medicaid coverage. 
Critical access hospitals (CAHs) and disproportionate share (DSH) hospitals are two types of 
hospitals with such characteristics. 
As defined by the CMS, CAHs are small, rural hospitals, with less than 25 beds located at 
least 35 miles by primary roads from the nearest hospital. CAHs serve as critical sources of 
medical care for populations that would otherwise be underserved. These rural hospitals are more 
financially vulnerable than higher-volume, larger urban hospitals, serve older and poorer 
populations (Wishner et al, 2016), have historically delivered lower quality of care (Lutfiyya, et 
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al 2007; Joynt et al 2011), have higher amounts of uncompensated care. Similarly, 
disproportionate share hospitals are federally designated hospitals that that “serve a significantly 
disproportionate number of low-income patients and receive payments from the Centers for 
Medicaid and Medicare Services to cover the costs of providing care to uninsured patients” 
(Health Resources & Services Administration, 2017). 
This analysis examines the economic effects of expansions in Medicaid eligibility on 
different types of hospitals. A difference-in-differences estimation approach is employed 
alongside hospital data from the Medicare Cost Reports (CMS, 2016) and Medicaid eligibility 
requirements from the Kaiser Family Foundation for a panel of US hospitals from 2000 to 2014. 
Under this quasi-experimental framework, hospitals are considered to be in treatment groups if 
Medicaid income eligibility limits in their states are greater than a pre-defined threshold. 
There exists a large body of literature studying the effects of Medicaid expansions prior 
to and under the Affordable Care Act (ACA) (Antonisse et al, 2017). Key findings from the 
literature are that Medicaid expansions reduce the percent of the population that is uninsured 
(Miller 2017; Sommers, et al 2017), increase the affordability, access, and utilization of medical 
care (Miller, 2017; Sommers, 2016; Sommers et al, 2017), and improve health outcomes for 
affected populations (Sommers, 2017; Ohio Department of Medicaid, 2016). Reductions in 
uncompensated care costs for hospitals and increases in profitability have also been broadly 
reported (Dranove et al, 2017; Blavin, 2017). Only a limited number of papers have explored the 
heterogeneous economic effects of Medicaid expansion on different types of hospitals, and 
generally have focused exclusively on the ACA. This paper seeks to contribute to that literature 
by exploring how the finances of different types of hospitals were affected by expansions in 
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Medicaid coverage from 2000 to 2014, broadening the analysis to include expansions beyond 
those of just the ACA. 
Results show heterogeneous effects on profitability for different types of hospitals. The 
largest effects are found for the two types of safety-net hospitals in our sample – CAHs and 
DSHs. These hospitals tend to serve more vulnerable patient populations and also tend to be 
more financially vulnerable. This has significant implications for policymakers contemplating 
changes to how hospitals are reimbursed. Results imply that safety-net hospitals are most 
impacted by changes to Medicaid coverage and that any reductions in coverage would 
disproportionately and negatively affect these hospitals. 
Conceptual Framework & Background 
The hypothesis is that hospitals receive financial benefits from expansions of Medicaid 
coverage vis-à-vis reductions in uncompensated care volume. Increases in Medicaid coverage 
and reductions in uncompensated care as a result of expansions in Medicaid eligibility are well-
established by the literature and other studies. However, the majority of research thus far has 
focused only on the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansions. Where this paper attempts to 
contribute is by examining the financial and economic effects of Medicaid expansions beyond 
that of just the ACA, and whether these effects are heterogeneous across different types of 
hospitals, and safety-net hospitals in particular.  
Medicaid is a government insurance program that is jointly funded by state and federal 
governments by managed by the states. States determine eligibility requirements for 
beneficiaries, regulate what services are covered, and set payment and reimbursement regimes 
for hospitals. This heterogeneity in Medicaid policy allows for identification of the effects of 
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expansions in Medicaid eligibility on hospital profitability. From 2000 to 2014, many states 
loosened Medicaid eligibility requirements. In 2000, only 7 states (including the District of 
Columbia) had family income eligibility for children above 250% of the federal poverty level. 
By 2014, 29 states did.  
Children and adults both form large fractions of the Medicaid population. In FY2013, 
children formed nearly half of the Medicaid beneficiary population at 46% of the total while 
adults formed 29% of the total (Medicaid and CHIP Payment and Access Commission, 2013). 
Medicaid eligibility is also more generous for children than it is for adults. The median eligibility 
limit in 2014 across all states was 255% of the FPL for children and 138% for parents; 138% of 
the FPL was only $27,310 for a family of 3 in that year. Adults that qualify for Medicaid are 
extremely poor and have few to no other options for health insurance coverage. 
One pervasive feature of the structure of hospital reimbursement in the United States is 
that hospitals price discriminate amongst different customers (Reinhardt, 2006). Every hospital 
has what is known as a chargemaster, a lengthy list of the hospital’s prices for “every single 
procedure performed in the hospital and for every supply item used during those procedures” 
(ibid). The prices billed by the hospital to patients and insurance companies, however, often bear 
no relationship to what the hospital actually receives as payment. The “true” prices paid by 
private insurance companies are actually usually set via private negotiation between hospitals 
and the insurance companies, often as percentage discounts off chargemaster prices. 
By contrast, payments by Medicare are set as flat-fees per case based on what are known 
as schedules of “diagnosis-related groups” (DRGs). Medicaid payment methods vary from state-
to-state. Most states reimburse inpatient payments as a percentage of Medicare DRGs, or as flat 
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per diem payments. Hospitals are effectively rendered price takers for Medicare and Medicaid 
patients and have little control over what they receive from these government insurers. Overall, 
hospitals operate at a loss when treating Medicare and Medicaid patients. According to the 
American Hospital Association, reimbursement-to-cost ratios for Medicaid patients averaged 
about 0.7 in 2014 and 0.9 for Medicare patients while commercial patients averaged 1.7. 
Medicaid accounted for 18% of total national spending on hospital care in 2015 (CMS, 2016). 
Perversely, uninsured patients are usually charged the highest prices for hospital care. 
These are the same patients most likely to be poor, unhealthy, and require more expensive 
medical care. Many default on the expensive hospital bills. Hospitals absorb these charges as bad 
debt or uncompensated care expense. These costs can be a large financial burden on hospitals, 
averaging about 6% of total hospital expenses in 2013 (AHA, 2016). 
Different hospitals are likely to respond differently to expansions in Medicaid coverage. 
Hospitals serving higher proportions of uninsured patients are likely to benefit the most from 
expansions in Medicaid eligibility. As Medicaid eligibility is expanded, uninsured individuals 
enroll in state Medicaid programs, reducing uncompensated care expenses and improving 
operating and financial results. Hospitals in wealthier service areas with wealthier patient bases 
and low uninsured populations are likely to experience diminished effects expansions in 
Medicaid coverage on financial results. 
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) has several official provider 
type designations that allow qualifying safety-net hospitals to be reimbursed using retrospective, 
cost-based methods instead of by DRGs. By CMS definition, critical access hospitals are rural 
hospitals with no more than 25 acute care inpatient beds located at least 35 miles from the 
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nearest hospital by primary road. They must provide 24/7 emergency care services and maintain 
an annual average length of stay of 96 hours or less for acute care patients. Similarly, 
disproportionate share hospital designation requires a DSH patient percentage (Medicare and 
Medicaid, non-Medicare patients) higher than 15% of total patient days. Because CAHs and 
DSHs have more uninsured patients than other hospitals, they are likely to receive greater 
benefits from expansions in Medicaid eligibility limits and coverage (Dobson et al, 2016).  
Literature Review 
There is a large body of literature studying the effects of Medicaid expansions under the 
Affordable Care Act. A literature review conducted by Antonisse et al. (2017) found no less than 
108 studies published between January 2014 and January 2017 examining this issue. Key 
findings from the literature are that the ACA Medicaid expansions had positive effects on 
insurance coverage and uninsurance rates, access to medical care, utilization, affordability, and 
health outcomes.  
In an article using survey data from three states, Sommers et al. (2017) found that, by the 
end of 2016, the uninsurance rate had dropped by more than 20 percentage points in two 
expansion states (Kentucky and Arkansas) relative to a nonexpansion state (Texas). They also 
found that, for previously uninsured people who now were covered by Medicaid, this change was 
associated with a 41-percentage-point increase in having a usual source of care, 23-percentage-
point increase in “excellent” self-reported health, and improvements in the affordability of care. 
Similarly, Miller and Wherry (2017) used data from the National Health Interview survey 
to examine whether the ACA Medicaid expansions were associated with changes in insurance 
coverage, health care use, and health among low-income adults. They found that uninsurance 
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rates were reduced in expansion states relative to nonexpansion states (difference-in-differences 
estimate, −8.2 percentage points; P<0.001) and that rates of Medicaid coverage increased (15.6 
percentage points; P<0.001). They also found decreases in reports of inability to afford needed 
follow-up care and in reports of worry about paying medical bills. 
Reductions in uncompensated care costs for hospitals and increases in profitability were 
also broadly reported. In the literature review conducted by Antonisse et al (2017), 19 papers 
found that hospitals in Medicaid expansion states experienced reductions in uninsured hospital 
visits and uncompensated care costs while providers in non-expansion states had little or no 
decline in uninsured visits and uncompensated care. 
Camilleri (2017) found that ACA Medicaid expansions significantly reduced hospital 
provision of uncompensated care in 2014. In particular, within expansion states, DSH hospitals 
saw reductions beyond those experienced by non-DSH hospitals, reducing the variation in the 
provision of uncompensated care between hospitals that treat a disproportionate share of low-
income patients and those that do not. Similarly, Sommers (2015) found that “more generous 
Medicaid eligibility and reimbursement policies improved [safety net] hospitals’ ability to 
recoup costs”. 
Cunningham (2016) found that the ACA expansions of Medicaid coverage had 
significant effects on hospital finances and payer mix—the overall share of revenues from 
different payers. Because hospitals are reimbursed at different rates by different payers, shifts in 
payer mix can dramatically affect hospital profitability. They cite “a number of reports [showing] 
increases in Medicaid discharges and declines in uninsured or self-pay discharges for hospitals 
located in states that implemented the Medicaid expansion. In contrast, hospitals located in states 
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that did not expand Medicaid are not seeing these large shifts in payer mix.” According to the 
authors, hospital margins are “influenced by numerous factors, the health care and policy 
environment is in flux, and some hospitals will be better able to adapt to these changes than 
others.” 
By contrast, few papers have studied the economic effects of pre-ACA Medicaid 
expansions on hospitals. Davidoff, et al (2000) found declines in uncompensated care after 
expansions in state Medicaid coverage. Two studies examined the determinants of hospital 
profitability. The first, Gapenski (1993), found that managerial and patient-mix variables were 
primary predictors of profitability. Structural factors beyond the control of managers, such as 
organizational and community characteristics, appeared to be less important in influencing 
profitability. The second, Bai and Anderson (2016), found that for-profit hospitals, higher 
markups, system affiliation, or regional power tended to be associated with higher profits. 
Hospitals that treated a higher proportion of Medicare patients, had higher expenditures per 
adjusted discharge, were located in counties with a high proportion of uninsured patients, or were 
located in states with a dominant insurer or greater health maintenance organization (HMO) 
penetration had lower profitability than hospitals that did not have these characteristics. 
A separate literature documents the vulnerability of safety-net hospitals, including CAHs, 
DSHs, and other safety-net hospitals. Reiter, et al (2015) found that CAHs have poorer patient 
populations, higher uncompensated care expense, and weaker financial profiles than other types 
of hospitals. A spate of rural hospital closures motivated the research in Wisher et al, (2016) 
which found that “a number of factors contributed to the [closures], including aging, poor, and 
shrinking populations, high uninsured rates and a payer mix dominated by Medicare and 
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Medicaid, economic challenges in the community, aging facilities, outdated payment and 
delivery system models, and business decisions by corporate owners/operators”. 
Dobson et al (2016) found that DSH hospitals and other safety-net hospitals had 
uncompensated care costs and Medicaid revenue twice the level of other acute-care hospitals in 
2015. The authors also found that DSH and other safety-net hospitals provided 33 percent of all 
inpatient days for Medicaid patients and nearly 30 percent of uncompensated care across all 
hospitals. Sommers (2015) examined 98 large, urban safety net hospitals, concluding that “more 
inclusive Medicaid eligibility and higher Medicaid reimbursement rates positively predicted 
safety net revenue-to-cost ratio”, results consistent with those presented in this paper.  
Blavin (2017) examines the effects of the ACA Medicaid expansions on the financial 
performance of different types of hospitals. He finds that, after the 2014 Medicaid expansion, 
“both operating margins and excess margins increased among hospitals in expansion states 
relative to hospitals in nonexpansion states. Mean annual operating margins in expansion states 
increased by 0.8 percentage points in FY 2014 and 1.9 percentage points in FY 2015, but 
operating margins in nonexpansion states declined by 0.6 percentage points in FY 2014 and 
increased by 0.8 percentage points in FY 2015,” results consistent with those found in this paper.  
Like Blavin (2017), this paper examines the economics effects of Medicaid expansions 
on different types of hospitals using a differences-in-differences estimation framework and 
Medicare Cost Reports data. This paper has many parallels to Blavin (2017) but departs and 
builds on that paper and the literature in three key ways: by expanding the time period analyzed; 
by expanding the analysis to include differential Medicaid eligibility requirements and timing of 
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expansions across different states; and by better identifying the types of hospitals most likely to 
be impacted by Medicaid expansions. 
This paper better identifies those types of hospitals by using pre-defined provider 
designations from the CMS. Differential effects were found by Blavin (2017) for urban versus 
rural hospitals and for small versus large hospitals. These classifications are proxies for the CMS 
hospital types used in this paper. CAHs are, by definition, small and rural hospitals and DSH 
hospitals tend to be urban hospitals with vulnerable patient populations. Teaching hospitals, also 
controlled for in our analysis, are shown to be generally large hospitals with academic 
affiliations. Use of these CMS hospital types should better identify which hospitals are most 
impacted by changes to Medicaid eligibility. 
We find the most significant effects are for CAHs and DSH hospitals, which have been 
shown by the literature to be associated with weaker financial profiles, more vulnerable patient 
populations, have higher rates of uninsurance, and greater uncompensated care expense.  
Data and Methods 
The Medicare Cost Reports is the primary data source for the analysis (CMS, 2015). The 
dataset contains aggregate information reported to the CMS by hospitals and is the most 
comprehensive hospital-specific dataset publicly available. It contains a wealth of data on 
hospital financials, utilization, geography, case-mix, and other characteristics. The sample period 
analyzed is from 2000 to 2014. Data on state Medicaid eligibility limits are from an annual 
survey conducted by the Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (2016). The survey 
offers an in-depth profile of state Medicaid and Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) 
eligibility requirements, overall enrollment levels, and cost sharing policies.  
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The analysis employs a differences-in-differences estimation approach to rest for the 
impact of Medicaid expansions on net profit margins.  Standard errors are clustered at the 
hospital level to correct for potential serial correlation problems as outlined in Bertrand et al 
(2003). The primary specification is defined as follows: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 
In the quasi-experimental framework, a hospital i is considered to be in the treatment 
group if their state expands Medicaid income eligibility limits beyond a pre-defined threshold. 
The indicator post equals one for hospitals in the years t after their state expanded Medicaid. 
This specification is analogous to a “traditional” two-period difference-in-differences 
framework, which typically have indicators for treatment groups, pre-treatment periods, post-
treatment periods, and an interaction between the treatment indicator and the post-treatment 
period. Two different eligibility limits and thresholds are used in separate regressions: using 
eligibility requirements for children in families of three and for parents in families of three, 
expressed as percentages of the federal poverty level (FPL). For regressions using the children’s 
eligibility requirement, we consider a hospital to be in the treatment group when income 
eligibility limits in their state are greater than or equal to 250% of the federal poverty level. For 
adults, the treatment group threshold is equal to 138% of the FPL. Thresholds are set higher for 
children than for adults to reflect the relative generosity of Medicaid eligibility for children. 
From 2000 to 2014, treatment groups increased in size relative to control groups as states 
expanded Medicaid coverage past the chosen thresholds. Using the children’s eligibility limit, 
38% of all observations are in the treatment group by 2014 compared to 22% of observations 
under the eligibility limit for parents (table 1). Tables 2 and 3 present historical Medicaid income 
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eligibility requirements for all states and Medicaid eligibility requirements that were generous 
enough for the treatment group. Other summary statistics for key variables are presented in table 
1. There are about 4,000 unique hospitals in the sample across 15 years of data, totaling 
approximately 54,000 hospital-year observations. 
Excess profit margin is the primary measure of profitability in the analysis, defined as net 
operating and non-operating income divided by total revenues. In the sample, profit margins are 
approximately normally distributed with a mean of 3.7% and a standard deviation of 10.4%, 
indicative of the significant variation in profitability across different hospitals (figure 1 and table 
1).  
The primary specification, however, does not reveal potentially heterogeneous financial 
effects of Medicaid expansion for different types of hospitals. As described above, CAHs and 
DSH hospitals may benefit more from expansions in Medicaid eligibility and coverage. The 
heterogeneity of these effects is captured using the second model below. In this hospital 
characteristics (HC) model, we add interaction terms between the difference-in-difference 
estimator and different types of hospitals to the primary specification. The HC model is defined 
as: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡
= 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡
+ 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡  ∗ 𝐻𝑜𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝑈𝑖𝑡 
Table 4 presents the frequency of the three different CMS provider types used in the 
analysis: critical access hospitals, disproportionate-share  hospitals, and teaching hospitals. 
Indicators for two other CMS provider type designations, sole community hospitals and 
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Medicare-dependent hospitals are excluded from the analysis; these two hospital types 
influenced regression results negligibly, and Medicare-dependent hospitals were just 4% of the 
overall sample. 
CAHs are an exclusive category. Only 92 observations were CAHs and also either a 
teaching hospital or a DSH  hospital. Some hospitals had both DSH hospital designation and 
teaching hospital designation, with about 11,000 observations included in both categories (table 
4). Teaching hospitals also tended to be larger. Of the 13,119 observations with teaching hospital 
designation in our sample, 8,939 (68%) were large hospitals, with greater than 200 patient beds 
(table 4).  
Results 
As noted earlier, several articles have found that the ACA-related expansions of 
Medicaid increased the utilization of medical care by individuals previously without insurance. 
Data in our sample yields similar results, implying that the treatment group definitions selected 
here are well-identified. Effects on Medicaid utilization are statistically significant using the 
children’s eligibility treatment definition, where hospitals in the treatment group are associated 
with 1,100 more Medicaid patient days (table 5). Effects are statistically insignificant using the 
parent’s eligibility treatment. This may be due to limitations of the data or unknown 
characteristics about the relationship between prior (non-ACA) Medicaid expansions and 
healthcare utilization. 
Results for the primary specification are presented in table 7, where net profit margins are 
regressed (separately) on the two different differences-in-differences estimators; CMS hospital 
type designations; number of hospital beds; and fixed effects for time and U.S. state. Hospitals in 
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the treatment group are associated with statistically significant increases in profitability—0.5-
percentage-points using the children’s eligibility limit (p <0.05, standard error = 0.231) and 0.6-
percentage-points using the parent’s eligibility limit (p <0.01, standard error = 0.199). The 
results imply that expansions in Medicaid coverage are associated with significant increases in 
profitability for the average hospital. The primary specification, however, does not identify 
potentially heterogeneous effects on different types of hospitals. 
Regression results for the hospital characteristics model, which do identify heterogeneous 
effects on profitability, are presented in table 8. These heterogeneous effects are captured using 
interaction terms between the different hospital types and the difference-in-difference estimators. 
Specifically, we create interaction terms between the treatment group and no CMS hospital type 
designation; the treatment group and CAHs; treatment group and teaching hospitals; and the 
treatment group and DSH hospitals. 
Results show that safety-net hospitals—CAHs and DSH hospitals—in the treatment 
group are associated with the largest gains in profitability from expansions in Medicaid 
eligibility into treatment groups. The coefficient on hospitals in the treatment group that are not 
safety-net hospitals or teaching hospitals is not statistically different from 0. Profitability effects 
are most pronounced for CAHs, which are associated with profitability increases of 1.7-
percentage-points using the children’s limit (p<0.01; standard error (SE) = 0.352) and 1.9-
percentage-points using the parent’s limit (p<0.1; SE =0.362). DSH hospitals are associated with 
a 0.6-percentage-point increase in profitability (p<0.05, standard error of .312) in the regression 
using the parent’s eligibility limit, and statistically insignificant using the children’s limit. 
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Conclusions 
This analysis finds that expansions in Medicaid eligibility are associated with increases in 
hospital profitability with critical access hospitals and disproportionate share hospitals being 
associated with the largest increases. The results provide insight into how different types of 
hospitals respond to increases or reductions in Medicaid eligibility. For policymakers 
considering scaling back the expansions in Medicaid enacted under the ACA, these findings 
suggest that any such reductions would disproportionately and negatively affect safety-net 
hospitals. 
A wealth of research has already demonstrated that safety-net hospitals are financially 
weaker than other hospitals; serve more vulnerable populations, with more Medicaid, uninsured, 
and low-income patients; and are critical sources of care for poor and rural communities and the 
healthcare system at large. Other factors not explored by this analysis that could affect the 
overall effects on profitability are Medicaid reimbursement levels; the acuity of a hospital’s 
patient case-mix; and whether or not the hospital is a provider of highly-specialized clinical 
services. 
This paper parallels but expands on Blavin (2017) in two key ways: by expanding the 
analysis to include Medicaid expansions outside of the Affordable Care Act and by better 
identifying the types of hospitals most likely to be impacted by changes to Medicaid eligibility 
and. It achieves the former by expanding the time periods analyzed to FY2000 through FY2014 
and by defining Medicaid expansions as expansions in Medicaid eligibility past pre-defined 
thresholds. Better identification of hospital types is achieved by using the CMS hospital type 
designations for critical access hospitals—which are small and rural—and DSH  hospitals—
which serve disproportionately more Medicaid patients. Blavin (2017), by contrast, examines 
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differential effects for urban versus rural hospitals and for small hospitals versus large hospitals, 
essentially the same variation already adequately captured by the CMS hospital designations. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of Net Profit Margins 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Frequency (%) 
Hospital-Years 53,138 100 
   
# in Treatment Group Using:   
Children’s Eligibility Limit 20,268 38 
Parent’s Eligibility Limit 11,786 22 
   
 Mean  
Medicaid Utilization (% of Total Patient 
Days) 
11.7%  
Medicaid Patient Days 5,183  
Net Patient Revenue $138.6 million  
Net Profit Margin 3.7%  
Beds 152  
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Table 2: Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits, as a Percent of FPL, for Children in Families of Size Three 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
US 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.35 2.41 2.38 2.35 2.55 2.55 2.55 
AL 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.17 3.17 3.17 
AK 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.75 2.08 2.08 2.08 
AZ 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.52 1.52 1.52 
AR 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.16 2.16 2.16 
CA 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.66 2.66 2.66 
CO 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.05 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.65 2.65 2.65 
CT 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.23 3.23 3.23 
DE 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.17 2.17 2.17 
DC 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.24 3.24 3.24 
FL 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.15 2.15 2.15 
GA 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.52 2.52 2.52 
HI 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.13 3.13 3.13 
ID 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.90 1.90 1.90 
IL 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.18 3.18 3.18 
IN 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.55 2.55 2.55 
IA 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.80 3.80 3.80 
KS 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.41 2.41 2.38 2.32 2.50 2.47 2.44 
KY 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.18 2.18 2.18 
LA 1.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.55 2.55 2.55 
ME 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.13 2.13 2.13 
MD 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.22 3.22 3.22 
MA 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.05 3.05 3.05 
MI 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.17 2.17 2.17 
MN 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.80 2.88 2.88 2.88 
MS 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.14 2.14 2.14 
MO 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.05 3.05 3.05 
MT 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.75 1.75 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.66 2.66 2.66 
NE 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.18 2.18 2.18 
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NV 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.05 2.05 
NH 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.23 3.23 3.23 
NJ 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.50 3.55 3.55 3.55 
NM 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 2.35 3.05 3.05 3.05 
NY 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.05 4.05 4.05 
NC 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.16 2.16 2.16 
ND 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.50 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.60 1.75 1.75 1.75 
OH 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.11 2.11 2.11 
OK 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.10 2.10 2.10 
OR 1.70 1.70 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.05 3.05 3.05 
PA 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.19 3.19 3.19 
RI 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.66 2.66 2.66 
SC 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.13 2.13 2.13 
SD 1.40 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.09 2.09 2.09 
TN 9.99 9.99 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.55 2.55 2.55 
TX 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.06 2.06 2.06 
UT 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.05 2.05 
VT 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.18 3.17 3.17 
VA 1.85 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.05 2.05 
WA 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.05 3.17 3.17 
WV 1.50 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.20 2.20 2.20 2.50 2.50 3.00 3.00 3.05 3.05 3.05 
WI 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.06 3.06 3.06 
WY 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.85 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.05 2.05 2.05 
Notes: Highlighted values indicate years in which income eligibility limits exceeded 250% of the FPL, our pre-defined threshold. 
Data from the Kaiser Family Foundation. 
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Table 3: Medicaid Income Eligibility Limits , as a Percent of FPL, for Parents in Families of Size 
Three 
 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
US 0.68 0.68 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.68 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 1.38 1.38 1.38 
AL 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.16 0.18 0.18 
AK 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.85 0.81 0.81 0.81 0.78 1.28 1.46 1.43 
AZ 1.07 1.07 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.38 1.38 1.38 
AR 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.16 1.38 1.38 1.38 
CA 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.38 1.38 1.38 
CO 0.42 0.42 0.47 0.47 0.39 0.38 0.67 0.66 0.66 0.66 1.06 1.06 1.06 1.38 1.38 1.38 
CT 1.57 1.57 1.07 1.07 1.07 1.57 1.57 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 2.01 2.01 1.55 
DE 1.22 1.22 1.20 1.20 1.17 1.07 1.07 1.06 1.21 1.21 1.20 1.19 1.20 1.38 1.38 1.38 
DC 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.07 2.06 2.06 2.21 2.21 2.21 
FL 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.63 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.35 0.34 0.34 
GA 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.52 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.48 0.39 0.38 0.37 
HI 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.38 1.38 1.38 1.38 
ID 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.30 0.43 0.42 0.28 0.27 0.39 0.39 0.37 0.27 0.27 0.26 
IL 0.56 0.56 0.83 0.83 1.40 1.92 1.92 1.91 1.85 1.85 1.91 1.91 1.39 1.38 1.38 1.38 
IN 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.36 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 1.39 
IA 0.87 0.87 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.79 0.77 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.83 0.82 0.80 1.38 1.38 1.38 
KS 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.32 0.32 0.31 0.38 0.38 0.38 
KY 0.75 0.75 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.68 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.57 1.38 1.38 1.38 
LA 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.26 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
ME 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 1.57 2.07 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.05 1.05 1.05 
MD 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.41 0.40 0.39 0.38 0.37 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.16 1.22 1.38 1.38 1.38 
MA 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.33 1.38 1.38 1.38 
MI 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.61 0.61 0.66 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.64 1.38 1.38 1.38 
MN 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.75 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.15 2.05 1.38 1.38 
MS 0.38 0.38 0.36 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.46 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27 
MO 1.07 1.07 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.42 0.40 0.39 0.26 0.25 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.24 0.23 0.22 
MT 0.69 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.65 0.64 0.62 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.56 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.51 1.38 
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NE 0.55 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.60 0.58 0.59 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.55 0.63 
NV 0.90 0.90 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.84 0.86 0.94 0.91 0.88 0.88 0.87 0.84 1.38 1.38 1.38 
NH 0.62 0.62 0.61 0.61 0.60 0.58 0.56 0.55 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.75 1.38 1.38 
NJ 2.00 2.00 0.42 0.42 0.41 1.00 1.15 1.33 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.38 1.38 1.38 
NM 0.58 0.58 0.71 0.71 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.69 0.67 0.67 0.85 0.85 1.38 1.38 1.38 
NY 1.33 1.33 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.50 1.38 1.38 1.38 
NC 0.62 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.47 0.45 0.45 0.44 
ND 1.10 1.10 0.94 0.94 0.69 0.67 0.65 0.63 0.62 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.57 1.38 1.38 1.38 
OH 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.96 1.38 1.38 1.38 
OK 0.48 0.48 0.46 0.46 0.45 0.44 0.43 0.50 0.48 0.47 0.53 0.53 0.51 0.48 0.46 0.44 
OR 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.39 1.38 1.38 1.38 
PA 0.56 0.56 0.66 0.66 0.66 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.36 0.34 0.46 0.46 0.58 0.38 1.38 1.38 
RI 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.91 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.81 1.38 1.38 1.38 
SC 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.97 1.00 0.90 0.89 0.93 0.91 0.89 0.67 0.67 0.67 
SD 0.65 0.65 0.63 0.63 0.61 0.59 0.58 0.56 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.50 0.54 0.53 0.52 
TN 0.81 0.81 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.81 0.80 0.80 1.34 1.29 1.27 1.26 1.22 1.11 1.03 1.01 
TX 0.32 0.32 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.19 0.19 0.18 
UT 0.55 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.50 0.49 0.47 0.68 0.44 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.47 0.46 0.45 
VT 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.91 1.38 1.38 1.38 
VA 0.31 0.31 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.52 0.45 0.39 
WA 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.81 0.79 0.76 0.77 0.74 0.74 0.73 0.71 1.38 1.38 1.38 
WV 0.28 0.28 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.37 0.36 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.32 0.31 1.38 1.38 1.38 
WI 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.92 1.92 1.92 1.91 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
WY 0.65 0.65 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.54 0.52 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.58 0.57 
Notes: Highlighted values indicate years in which income eligibility limits exceeded 250% of the FPL, our pre-defined threshold. 
Data from the Kaiser Family Foundation. 
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Table 4: Tabulation of Hospital Types 
 
Teaching Hospitals and Other Hospital Types 
 
DSH Hospital 
 
Critical Access Hospital No Yes Total 
No 2,073 10,978 13,051 
Yes 67 1 68 
Total 2,140 10,979 13,119 
    
Non-Teaching Hospitals and Other Hospital 
Types 
 
DSH Hospital 
 
Critical Access Hospital No Yes Total 
No 6,503 20,022 26,525 
Yes 13,470 24 13,494 
Total 19,973 20,046 40,019 
 
Most Large Hospitals Are Teaching Hospitals 
  
Large Hospitals 
(> 200 Beds) 
  
Teaching Hospital No Yes Total 
No 34,900 5,119 40,019 
Yes 4,180 8,939 13,119 
Total 39,080 14,058 53,138 
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Table 5: Effects of Medicaid Expansions on Medicaid Utilization 
  
Medicaid Utilization (% of 
Total Patient Days) 
Medicaid Patient Days 
 
Children's 
Limit 
Parent's Limit 
Children's 
Limit 
Parent's Limit 
Treatment Effect 1.601*** -0.857*** 630.0*** -281.4*** 
 
(0.186) (0.171) (111.2) (97.23) 
Critical Access 
Hospital 
2.063*** 2.077*** 3,074*** 3,080*** 
 
(0.406) (0.406) (283.3) (283.4) 
DSH-Eligible 
Hospital 
7.794*** 7.813*** 2,253*** 2,261*** 
 
(0.352) (0.352) (251.1) (251.2) 
Teaching Hospital 2.711*** 2.705*** 2,443*** 2,440*** 
 
(0.386) (0.386) (350.7) (350.8) 
Beds 0.00103 0.00101 40.57*** 40.56*** 
 
(0.000918) (0.000917) (2.168) (2.169) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 14.56*** 14.31*** -2,194*** -2,292*** 
 
(1.897) (1.895) (655.8) (656.3) 
     
Observations 53,138 53,138 51,559 51,559 
R-squared 0.276 0.275 0.608 0.608 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the hospital-level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
32 
 
Table 6: Effects of Medicaid Expansions on Medicaid Utilization for Different 
Hospitals 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Medicaid Utilization (% 
of Total Patient Days) 
Medicaid Patient 
Days 
  
Children’s 
Limit 
Parent’s 
Limit 
Children’s 
Limit 
Parent’s 
Limit 
Treatment -0.00388 -0.569 1,165*** 507.7 
 
(0.491) (0.484) (357.2) (338.6) 
+ CAH Interaction 3.387*** -0.751 763.9*** 181.1 
 
(0.485) (0.467) (170.8) (189.3) 
+ Teaching Interaction 1.143** -0.703 817.4 -874.1** 
 
(0.515) (0.428) (513.0) (381.3) 
+ DSH Interaction 0.827** -1.240*** 176.0 -363.9 
 
(0.371) (0.384) (235.6) (244.1) 
Critical Access Hospital 0.954** 2.080*** 3,139*** 3,091*** 
 
(0.452) (0.446) (314.0) (296.9) 
DSH-Eligible Hospital 7.583*** 7.906*** 2,513*** 2,401*** 
 
(0.427) (0.391) (304.8) (280.2) 
Teaching Hospital 2.508*** 2.617*** 2,268*** 2,634*** 
 
(0.402) (0.406) (412.4) (374.7) 
Beds 0.00112 0.000997 40.53*** 40.50*** 
 
(0.000915) (0.000915) (2.163) (2.164) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State Indicators Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 15.28*** 14.29*** -2,304*** 
-
2,409*** 
 
(1.888) (1.898) (675.4) (654.9) 
     Observations 53,138 53,138 51,559 51,559 
R-squared 0.279 0.275 0.608 0.608 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the hospital-level in parentheses 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1 
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Table 7: Primary Model: Effects of Medicaid Expansion on Profitability 
 
Net Profit Margin 
  
Children's 
Eligibility Limit 
Parent's Eligibility 
Limit 
Treatment Effect 0.516** 0.641*** 
 
(0.231) (0.199) 
Critical Access Hospital -4.060*** -4.063*** 
 
(0.397) (0.397) 
DSH-Eligible Hospital -2.035*** -2.039*** 
 
(0.311) (0.311) 
Beds 0.00520*** 0.00521*** 
 
(0.000703) (0.000703) 
Teaching Hospital -0.608** -0.613** 
 
(0.250) (0.250) 
Constant 6.579*** 6.588*** 
 
(1.593) (1.596) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
State Indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 53,138 53,138 
R-squared 0.057 0.058 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the hospital-level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8: Hospital Characteristics Model: Effects of Medicaid Expansion on 
Profitability for Different Hospitals 
  (1) (2) 
 
Children’s 
Eligibility 
Limit 
Parent’s 
Eligibility 
Limit 
      
Treatment  -0.659 -0.0518 
 
(0.575) (0.619) 
+ CAH interaction 1.721*** 1.894*** 
 
(0.352) (0.362) 
+ Teaching interaction -0.0242 -0.110 
 
(0.373) (0.300) 
+ DSH interaction 0.232 0.612** 
 
(0.323) (0.312) 
Critical Access Hospital -4.814*** -4.489*** 
 
(0.474) (0.439) 
DSH-Eligible Hospital -2.264*** -2.125*** 
 
(0.361) (0.336) 
Teaching Hospital -0.578* -0.443 
 
(0.310) (0.274) 
Beds 0.00527*** 0.00520*** 
 
(0.000702) (0.000701) 
Constant 7.078*** 6.710*** 
 
(1.589) (1.593) 
Year Indicators Yes Yes 
State Indicators Yes Yes 
Observations 53,138 53,138 
R-squared 0.059 0.058 
Robust standard errors, clustered at the hospital-level in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
   
 
